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COMMENTS
COLLYER INSULATED WIRE: THE NLRB
FURTHER OPENS THE GATE TOWARD
TOTAL INDUSTRIAL SELF-REGULATION
INTRODUCTION
The Significance of the Collyer Decision
In Collyer' the National Labor Relations Board has deter-
mined to defer its jurisdiction in regard to the adjudication of Un-
fair Labor Practice complaints, as specified in the National Labor
Relations Act, to the signatories of a collective-bargaining agree-
ment which contains a grievance-arbitration clause. This deci-
sion is representative of a growing number of labor decisions
through which the National Labor Relations Board is attempting
to modernize the regulatory machinery provided in the National
Labor Relations Act. With this decision, the National Labor Re-
lations Board has taken one further step to provide for the total
self-regulation of industry. Whether such actions are in accord
with present congressional thinking remains open to dispute. It
would appear that the National Labor Relations Board is making
a concerted effort to force Congress either to acquiesce in this cur-
rent trend of decisions, or to declare its own intentions, via legis-
lative action, with regard to the regulation of American industry.
Until Congress takes action, however, the National Labor Rela-
tions Board continues to seek modernization of the regulatory
powers granted to it by the National Labor Relations Act through
its semi-judicial decisions. The purpose of this comment is to ex-
plore this "contest" whose outcome will have a significant effect
upon the regulation of American industry and the future negotia-
tion of collective-bargaining agreements. This discussion will be
concerned with an analysis of the Collyer decision; with an at-
tempt to illustrate the rationale utilized by the National Labor Re-
lations Board in its effort to determine Congressional intent in re-
gard to industrial self-regulation.
1. Collyer Insulated Wire, A Gulf and Western System Co., and Local
Union 1098, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO, 192
N.L.R.B. No. 150, -, 77 L.R.R.M. 1931 (1971).
COLLYER INSULATED WIRE
The Development of Labor Legislation
The entire gamut of labor legislation has been conceived in
response to the relative strength of the American union movement
in its drive to gain equal bargaining power with industrial man-
agement. Beginning in 1935 with the adoption of the National
Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act)2, the government, acting un-
der the New Deal philosophy of job security for American labor,
sought to provide a secure base for the continued development of
labor unions.' To accomplish these ends, the National Labor Re-
lations Act (commonly known as the N.L.R.A. or "the Act")
protected the right of unions to organize and to represent their
membership in collective-bargaining agreements free from em-
ployer interference.' The Act also defined a series of unfair la-
bor practices to control the actions of employers in their attempts
to frustrate the growth of the fledgling unions.' To insure com-
pliance with these regulations, the Act created the National Labor
Relations Board (commonly referred to as the N.L.R.B. or "the
Board").6 It is the Board's function to administrate the tenets of
the National Labor Relations Act by investigating and adjudicat-
ing unfair labor practice complaints.
With the onslaught of World War II and its consequent
drain on American manpower, the union movement underwent a
dramatic change. Rather than fighting to establish an identity
within industry, the unions became a dominant industrial force in
themselves.7 Their strength was amply demonstrated through a
number of crippling postwar strikes which served to paralyze the
nation's economy.8 As a result of this awesome display of raw
union power, the movement frightened away a great deal of its
popular support.' It was evident that the unions were on the
path to becoming an indestructible economic giant. In time,
without proper supervision and control, the unions would soon
become the dominant force in American industry and possess the
ability to exercise complete control over the destiny of the Ameri-
can industrial movement.' 0
In response, Congress felt compelled to stem the increasing
2. National Labor Relations Act 1935 (Wagner Act), ch. 372, 49 Stat.
449 [hereinafter cited N.L.R.A.], 29 U.S.C. § 151-68 (1970).
3. R. Corley & R. Black, THE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT OF BUSINESS 542
(2d ed. 1968).
4. N.L.R.A. § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970).
5. N.L.R.A. § 8(a), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1970).
6. N.L.R.A. § 3, 29 U.S.C. § 153 (1970).
7. See note 3, supra, at 543.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
1972]
SANTA CLARA LAWYER
power of the labor unions. This reaction is reflected in the Labor
Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act)" of 1947. Con-
gress intended the Taft-Hartley Act to so amend the National La-
bor Relations Act as to strike a balance between management and
labor.12  The provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act included: the
designation of unfair labor practices; 13 an 80 day "cooling off"
period to avert public-endangering strikes and lock-outs;14 and
the creation of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service to
aid in the settlement of disputes. 5 In addition, Section 30116 of
the Taft-Hartley Act made the union and the employer subject to
suit by one another, or by the individual employee. It also served
to outlaw the "closed shop" agreement whereby a union could in-
sist that only union personnel would be hired within the particu-
lar industry.' 7
Current State of Federal Labor Law
While the face of American industry has undergone rapid al-
teration there has been relatively little change to federal labor reg-
ulation since the adoption of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947.
Among those advocating reformation and modernization of the
federal regulatory machinery is Edward B. Miller, the current
chairman of the National Labor Relations Board.' It is Chair-
man Miller's opinion that the present law is too rigid, and thus
unable to meet the current demands of modern labor practice."
While the National Labor Relations Act and the Taft-Hartley
amendments to that Act represented a great break-through in the
area of federal labor regulation, they have now lost their effective-
ness and must stand aside for more enlightened regulation.2"
One of the current difficulties facing the Board, while oper-
ating under the current regulations, is the necessity to attempt to
assess congressional intent in ruling upon modern labor agree-
ments. Does Congress desire strict compliance with the language
of the Act? Or would Congress prefer that the greater emphasis
be placed upon the "voluntary" settlement of labor grievances, in-
cluding complaints of unfair labor practices?
11. Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act) ch. 120,
61 Stat. 136 [hereinafter cited L.M.R.A.1, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-44, 171, 173-87
(1970).
12. See note 3, supra, at p. 557.
13. N.L.R.A. § 8(b), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1970).
14. L.M.R.A. §§ 206-10, 29 U.S.C. §§ 176-80 (1970).
15. L.M.R.A. § 202, 29 U.S.C. § 172 (1970).
16. L.M.R.A. § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970).
17. N.L.R.A. § 8(b)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1970).
18. BNA, "Daily Labor Report" No. 167, p. D-1, (Aug. 27, 1971).
19. Id.
20. Id.
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An Example of This Dilemma
An appropriate example of this dilemma is presented in Col-
iyer Insulated Wire,"1 in which the Board attempted to establish
an administrative precedent, but was forced to speculate upon
present congressional intent in interpreting the Act. It is the
Board's contention, in light of past congressional and Supreme
Court expressions encouraging the self-regulation of labor, that if
the parties have included a grievance and arbitration clause in
their collective-bargaining agreement, then all disputes, including
unfair labor practices, should be determined under the provisions
of that clause. To reach this result, the Board has had to inter-
pret the Act freely. A careful examination of the Collyer deci-
sion will demonstrate this dilemma and will illustrate the circuitous
route which the Board had to follow in order to establish its views
in this area.
AN ANALYSIS OF THE BOARD'S OPINION IN COLLYER
INSULATED WIRE, A GULF AND WESTERN SYSTEM
CO. AND LOCAL UNION 1098, INTERNATIONAL
BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS,
AFL-CIO, 192 NLRB No. 150.
Situation
The Collyer company was faced with a steady loss of its
skilled maintenance personnel (plant engineers and electricians)
because of its inability to offer an attractive wage under its collec-
tive-bargaining agreement with the union. Under the wage
scheme encompassed in this agreement, production workers were
paid on an incentive basis,22 while the wage rate for skilled main-
tenance personnel was determined on an hourly basis. Through-
out their bargaining relationship, Collyer had routinely made ad-
justments in the incentive rates for production personnel to re-
flect new or changed production methods. Under this agree-
ment, the only means available to effect changes in the wage rate
for skilled maintenance personnel was through an upgrading in
the job evaluation or by modification of the duties in an existing
job classification.
During the current contract negotiations, Collyer urged that
it be allowed to increase the wage rates for skilled maintenance
personnel in order to place their salaries on a par with those of
21. 192 N.L.R.B. No. 150, -, 77 L.R.R.M. 1931 (1971).
22. Under an "incentive" pay system the employee is paid upon the basis
of the number of units which he produces. In effect, he receives a base salary
with the ability of increasing that salary through a higher rate of production
than is adjudged as the norm by' the employer.
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competing industries. The union refused to allow these raises
unless there was a corresponding raise for production personnel.
Unable to come to any agreement on this issue, the parties agreed
to leave the matter open for further negotiations after the execu-
tion of their new collective-bargaining agreement. At a series of
meetings following the conclusion of the contract negotiations,
Collyer again unsuccessfully attempted to institute raises for the
skilled maintenance personnel. Finally Collyer acted unilater-
ally and announced to the union that it was going to institute a
wage increase of 20 per hour for all skilled maintenance per-
sonnel. The union protested this move and restated its desire for
a re-evaluation of all jobs at the plant. Collyer agreed to recon-
sider a complete re-evaluation upon the union's consent to the up-
ward wage raise for the skilled maintenance personnel. The
union refused, and Collyer instituted the proposed wage raises."
The collective-bargaining agreement between Collyer and
the union contained a detailed grievance and arbitration proce-
dure which required the submission of all contract disputes to ar-
bitration. Rather than following that grievance-arbitration pro-
cedure, the union bypassed the collective-bargaining agreement
and filed an unfair labor practice complaint with the National
Labor Relations Board. In its complaint, the union charged that
Collyer had instituted unilateral changes contrary to the provisions
of the collective-bargaining agreement.2 4
A Trial Examiner was dispatched by the Board to investi-
gate the charges and to determine their validity. The Trial Ex-
aminer determined that the parties had discussed these proposed
wage changes, and that the union had not agreed to the proposed
changes. It was further determined that the collective-bargaining
agreement did not authorize Collyer to act unilaterally by reas-
signment and wage raises. In so acting, Collyer had attempted to
ignore the basic wage provisions contained in the agreement. The
Trial Examiner concluded that, with the exception of the rate
changes in the incentive rates, Collyer's actions were in violation
of the collective-bargaining agreement, and hence constituted an
unfair labor practice under Section 8(a) (1) and (5) of the Act,
Refusal to Bargain.25
23. Collyer's unilateral action involved a re-evaluation of the skill factor for
maintenance personnel who were reassigned to "worm gear" removal; plus
changes in the incentive rates for extruder operators.
24. 192 N.L.R.B. No. 150 at -, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1932.
25. Id. at -, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1934, citing N.L.R.A. § 8(a)(1) & (5), 29
U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) & (5) (1970). This section provides that it shall be an
unfair labor practice for an employer "to refuse to bargain collectively with the
representatives of his employees subject to the provisions of Section 9(a) [29
U.S.C. § 159(a)]." (Section 8(a)(1) makes it an unfair labor practice "to in-
[Vol. 13
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Collyer appealed the Trial Examiner's determination to the
Board, arguing that this dispute arose entirely from the contract
between the parties and should be settled by the arbitration ma-
chinery prescribed in that agreement. The main issue to be de-
cided by the Board was therefore whether the National Labor Re-
lations Board ought to defer its jurisdiction and require the par-
ties to rely upon the terms of their collective-bargaining agree-
ment for settlement by arbitration.
The Board Seeks To Review Its Position In Regard To Arbitra-
tion Agreements and Awards
Can the Board defer to an arbitration award? In answer-
ing this question the Collyer majority points to the fact that past
appellate and United States Supreme Court decisions have never
questioned the Board's ability to defer to an arbitrator's award.
This fact is illustrated in two appellate court decisions, Sinclair
Refining Co. v. NLRB,' 6 and Timken Roller Bearing Co. v.
NLRB.2 7 The Supreme Court decision in Amalgamated Associa-
tion of Street, Electric Railway and Motor Coach Employees v.
Lockridge,'8 also reflects this point of view.
In Sinclair the union filed a complaint with the Board in an
effort to force the company to produce relevant information to
be used by an arbitrator in rendering his award. The Board con-
strued the complaint as detailing an unfair labor practice under
Section 8(a) (5) of the Act.29 The court ruled that where the
parties have prescribed a voluntary grievance procedure, the
courts should enforce the utilization of such procedure and re-
frain from determining the merits of the controversy at issue.30
Therefore, it is up to the arbitrator to fashion his own discovery
procedure, and the Board's ruling should have no effect.3
In Timken the company refused to negotiate grievances dur-
ing an illegal strike. In response to a complaint filed by the
union the Board issued a cease and desist order requiring the
company to negotiate these grievance claims. The company pe-
titioned the court to have this order set aside. The court deter-
mined that no provision of the Act either expressly or by implica-
tion limited the right of the parties to a collective-bargaining
terfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaran-
teed in section 7" and is cited whenever there has been a violation of any of
the other unfair labor practice provisions.)
26. 306 F.2d 569 (5th Cir., 1962).
27. 161 F.2d 949 (6th Cir., 1947).
28. 403 U.S. 274 (1971).
29. N.L.R.A. § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5) (1970).
30. 306 F.2d 569, 575.
31. Id. at 578-79.
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agreement, and that an arbitration procedure should be consid-
ered as part of the collective-bargaining agreement. 2 Therefore,
the court concluded that there was no commission of an unfair
labor practice and that the employer's efforts to channel all dis-
putes, including the illegal strike, into the arbitration machinery
provided by their collective-bargaining agreement did not consti-
tute a refusal to bargain, nor provide any showing of bad faith on
the part of the employer.
The Lockridge decision presents the latest Supreme Court
pronouncement on the subject of collective-bargaining and the
ability of the parties to resolve their own disputes through mu-
tually agreeable grievance-arbitration procedures. In this case,
Lockridge was discharged on the ground that he had forfeited his
membership in good standing with the union by failing to keep
current with his union dues. Because of this failure to maintain
his "good standing" status, the employer was obligated to dis-
charge Lockridge under the union security agreement contained
in the collective-bargaining agreement between the union and the
employer. Lockridge brought suit in the state courts against the
union.83 In deciding this case, the Supreme Court relied upon
the rule stated in San Diego Building Trades Council v. Gar-
mon3 4 which held that the National Labor Relations Board pre-
empts state and federal court jurisdiction where the conduct in
controversy is either protected or prohibited by the Act."3 How-
ever, the court did note some exceptions to this rule. One excep-
tion may arise where the Board has affirmatively indicated that,
in its view, pre-emption would not be appropriate.36 As a second
exception to the Garmon rule, the court determined that collec-
tive-bargaining agreements under Section 30117 are also ex-
empted.38 This second exception was based solely on the ex-
pressed congressional desire for the voluntary settlement of labor
disputes which fall under collective-bargaining agreements.3 9
On the basis of these decisions the Board determined that it
did have the ability to defer to an arbitration award without cre-
ating a significant break with past Board policy and precedent.
32. 161 F.2d 949, 954.
33. See Lockridge v. Amalgamated Assn. of Street, Electric Railway & Mo-
tor Coach Employees, 93 Idaho 294, -, 460 P.2d 719, 724 (1969); wherein
the state court found the union to have violated §§ 8(b)(1)(a) and 8(b)(2)
which "probably causes" the employer to violate § 8(a)(3). Case was brought
to the Supreme Court on the basis of a "federal question" by the union.
34. 359 U.S. 236, (1959) cited at 403 U.S. 274, 276 (1971).
35. 403 U.S. 274, 284 (1971).
36. Id. at 298 n.8.
37. L.M.R.A. § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970).
38. 403 U.S. 274, 300-01 (1971).
39. Id.
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The Board is granted exclusive jurisdiction under Section
10(a) of the Act to adjudicate unfair labor practice complaints.
The Collyer majority next examines its authority to adjudicate un-
fair labor practice complaints under Section 10(a)4 ° of the Act.
This section grants the Board exclusive jurisdiction over unfair
labor practice complaints. However, there is nothing in the Act
which intimates that the Board is required to exercise its jurisdic-
tion where mutually acceptable remedies are apparent on the face
of the collective-bargaining agreement.4 In other words, there
is nothing in the language of the Act which requires the Board
to exercise its authority over unfair labor practice complaints
arising under Section 842 of the Act.
The Taft-Hartley amendments provide machinery for the
voluntary settlement of labor disputes. At this juncture the Col-
lyer majority attempts to illustrate situations in which the courts
have upheld deferral of jurisdiction for settlement under a collec-
tive-bargaining agreement. This argument becomes somewhat
strained as they attempt to analogize cases which were decided
under Section 30141 of the Act as present authority to permit de-
ferral of jurisdiction under Section 8 (Unfair Labor Practices)."
To support this argument, the majority looks to Carey v. West-
inghouse45 and Smith v. Evening News Assn.40
In Carey there was a jurisdictional dispute between two
unions which represented the employees in one plant. The em-
ployer refused to arbitrate this grievance on the ground that it
presented a representation issue which could only be determined
by the N.L.R.B. On hearing the issue, the U.S. Supreme Court
determined that the Board had the power to give effect to a pri-
vate agreement under Section 10(k)4 7 of the Act, and further
that such resolution was clearly intended by Congress with the
passage of that section.48 The court continued by finding that al-
though the parties have pursued a private remedy, they are not to
be foreclosed from filing charges with the Board if they are dis-
satisfied with their private solution.4" The Board then has the
choice of either finding that the private award was fair and not
40. N.L.R.A. § 10(a), 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1970).
41. 192 N.L.R.B. No. 150,-, 77 L.R.R.M. 1931, 1943 (1971).
42. N.L.R.A. § 8, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1970).
43. L.M.R.A. § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970).
44. N.L.R.A. § 8, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1970).
45. 375 U.S. 261 (1964).
46. 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
47. N.L.R.A. § 10(k), 29 U.S.C. § 160(k) (1970).
48. 375 U.S. 261, 264-65 (1964); wherein the Court quotes 93 Cong. Rec.
4035, 2 Leg. Hist. L.M.R.A. (1947) 1046.
49. Id. at 270-71.
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repugnant to the Act, or adjudicating the issue under the provi-
sions of the Act.50 Though this case concerned disputes arising
under Section 30151 of the Act, the court does imply that the
same principles of private settlement would apply to unfair labor
practice complaints.
In Smith the petitioner brought an action on behalf of him-
self and other assignee union members. In his complaint, Smith
claimed that he was unwillingly locked-out from his place of work
because of a strike being conducted by another union. It was
Smith's contention that as long as he was ready, willing and able
to work, he should be paid in the same manner as management
personnel, who were paid during the strike although there was no
work for them to perform. The Supreme Court heard this case
and determined that the action complained of fell under the pro-
visions of Section 30152 of the Act. It further determined that the
the state court could exercise jurisdiction in the matter.53  In its
opinion, the court stated that the Board can deal with an unfair
labor practice which also violates a collective-bargaining agree-
ment. However, the Board cannot demand exclusive jurisdiction
which denies the courts the ability to render a decision under the
provisions of Section 301 and the terms of the collective-bargain-
ing agreement. 54
To buttress the argument made by Carey and Smith, the
Collyer majority reviews those sections of the Act which directly
provide for or encourage arbitration. In this discussion the
Board looks to Section 203(d)55 in which Congress declared
that:
Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is
hereby declared to be the desirable method for settlement
of grievance disputes arising over the application or interpre-
tation of an existing collective-bargaining agreement.
The majority next looks to Section 301,56 which allows state or
federal court suits to enforce collective-bargaining agreements, as
indicative of congressional intent for the creation of a voluntary
labor system. In its opinion, the Collyer majority states:
Admittedly, neither section 203 nor section 301 applies spe-
cifically to the Board. However, labor law as administered
by the Board does not operate in a vacuum isolated from
50. Id. at 271-72.
51. L.M.R.A. § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970).
52. L.M.R.A. § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970); cited at 371 U.S. 195, 201
(1962).
53. 371 U.S. 195, 200 (1962).
54. Id. at 197.
55. L.M.R.A. § 203(d), 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1970).
56. L.M.R.A. § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970).
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other parts of the Act, or, indeed, from other acts of Con-gress. In fact, the legislative history suggests that at the time
the Taft-Hartley amendments were being considered, Con-
gress anticipated that the Board would develop by rules and
regulations, a policy of enertaining under these provisions
only such cases . . . as cannot be settled by resort to the
machinery established by the contract itself, voluntary ar-
bitration .... 57
To illustrate this acceptance of arbitration under collective-bar-
gaining agreements, the Collyer majority discusses those Supreme
Court cases commonly referred to as the Steelworkers Trilogy"8
and Southern Steamship Co. v. NLRB59 as appropriate authority
for the Board's analogy between Section 30160 cases and those
which arise under Section 861 of the Act.
The Steelworkers Trilogy cases were decided under Section
301,62 and upheld the principle of arbitration as a means of vol-
untary settlement of management-labor contract disputes. In
these decisions the Supreme Court declared that the only role
granted to a lower federal or state court in enforcing an arbitra-
tion agreement is to determine that the matter in dispute does, in-
deed, fall within the confines of the collective-bargaining agree-
ment. It is not the role of the lower courts to attempt to deter-
mine the merits of the controversy, but solely to provide enforce-
ment of the arbitration procedure.6 3
In Southern Steamship, the Board ordered that the employ-
ees aboard the company's seven ships hold elections to determine
which union was to represent them as their collective-bargaining
agent. On all but one ship, the employer's representatives were
allowed to monitor these elections. On the seventh ship, the
union denied the employer's representative admission to the elec-
tion. As a result of this denial, the employer refused to recognize
the election results and the certification of the union as the col-
lective-bargaining representative for its employees. Despite the
employer's objection to the election, the Board certified the union
as the bargaining agent. Six months later, the union filed an un-
fair labor practice complaint with the Board charging the peti-
57. 192 N.L.R.B. No. 150, -, 77 L.R.R.M. 1931, 1935 (1971); quoting
S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 23 Leg. Hist. of L.M.R.A. 1947, p. 429.58. United Steelworkers of America v. American Manufacturing Co., 363U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Naviga-
tion Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise
Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
59. 361 U.S. 31 (1942).
60. L.M.R.A. § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970).
61. N.L.R.A. § 8, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1970).
62. L.M.R.A. § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970).
63. 363 U.S. 564, 568 (1960).
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tioner with refusing to bargain. As a result of this refusal a
strike had been called which resulted in the dismissal of 25 union
members. These discharges were determined by the Board to be
solely due to the employees' membership in the union. In ruling
upon the complaint, the Board determined that the employer was
liable for a refusal to negotiate and issued a cease and desist order
in conjunction with an order for the reinstatement of the dis-
charged employees. The employer objected to this order, and
the matter was eventually brought before the Supreme Court.
The court ruled that although the Board could determine perti-
nent certification procedures, it cannot effectuate the policies of
labor relations so single-mindedly as to totally ignore other con-
gressional objectives. It is necessary to look to the entire scope
of congressional objectives in order to accommodate one statutory
scheme and intent with another. " In other words, the court was
telling the Board that it should strive to allow the voluntary settle-
ment of disputes wherever and whenever possible; thus accentuat-
ing the stated and intended congressional policy of industrial self-
regulation.
Situations Under Which The Board Seeks To Defer To Arbitra-
tion
The question of whether the Board should defer its proc-
esses to an arbitrator's decision arises only when an alleged viola-
tion of the Act also breaches a collective-bargaining agreement
which contains a grievance-arbitration procedure. This situation,
as illustrated in Collyer, requires an accommodation between stat-
utory policy favoring the fullest use of collective-bargaining, and
the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act reflecting a
strict jurisdictional grant to the National Labor Relations Board
to adjudicate unfair labor practices.
Past cases indicate that the Board has deferred its jurisdic-
tion where there is an existing arbitration clause, and where; 1)
there is an existing award, or 2) where no award has yet issued.
Where there has already been an arbitral award. In the
Board hearing of the Timken Roller Bearing5 case, the Board re-
frained from exercising its jurisdiction in deference to an arbitra-
tor's award, although it would have been able to find an unfair
labor practice. The Board explained its decision to defer juris-
diction in this manner: "It would not comport with the sound
exercise of our administrative discretion to permit the Union to
64. 316 U.S. 31, 47 (1942).
65. Timken Roller Bearing Co. and United Steelworkers of America, 70
N.L.R.B. 500, 18 L.R.R.M. 1370 (1946).
[Vol. 13
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seek redress under the Act after having initiated arbitration pro-
ceedings which, at the Union's request, resulted in a determina-
tion upon the merits." 6
This policy was further refined with the Board's decision in
Spielberg Manufacturing Co.17  In that case, as part of a strike
settlement, the parties agreed to arbitrate whether four of the
strikers should be reinstated in spite of the employer's objection
to their conduct on the picket lines. All of the parties were rep-
resented at the arbitration hearing where it was decided that the
employer was not required to rehire these personnel. The dis-
charged employees then filed an unfair labor practice complaint
against the employer. The Trial Examiner recommended that a
cease and desist order be issued in conjunction with an order re-
quiring the employer to rehire the discharged employees. In its
determination, the Board dismissed the complaint and deferred
its jurisdiction to the arbitration award. 68 It found that the arbi-
tration proceedings had been fair to all parties, that all parties
had agreed to the principle of binding arbitration, and that the
award was not repugnant to the purposes and policies of the
Act."6 Under such circumstances, the opinion declared, the
Board would find it desirable to encourage a voluntary settle-
ment of a labor dispute.7" The standard announced in the Spiel-
berg decision has become the Board's test whenever it considers
deferral of its jurisdiction to an arbitrator's award.
Cases in which no arbitration award has been issued. The
Board's past policy in regard to deferral of jurisdiction where no
award has been issued is less well defined than where an award
has already been made. At times, the Board has dealt with the
unfair labor practice complaint despite the presence of an arbi-
tration agreement. In other situations, the Board has simply de-
cided to leave the disputants to their contractual remedies.
As an illustration of those situations in which the Board has
deferred to an arbitration agreement in which there was no
award, the Board cites Consolidated Aircraft Corp.,71 and Jos.
Schlitz Brewing Co.72
In Consolidated Aircraft, the parties had an agreement in
66. Id. at 501, 18 L.R.R.M. at 1371.
67. Spielberg Manufacturing Co. and Harold Gruenberg, 112 N.L.R.B.
1080, 36 L.R.R.M. 1152 (1955).
68. Id. at 1082, 18 L.R.R.M. at 1153.
69. Id.
70. id.
71. Consolidated Aircraft Corp. and Machinists Lodge 1125, 47 N.L.R.B.
694, 36 L.R.R.M. 44 (1943).
72. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co. and Brewery Workers Local 9, 175 N.L.R.B.
141, 70 L.R.R.M. 1472 (1969).
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which Consolidated recognized the union as the exclusive bargain-
ing agent of all hourly paid employees and salaried inspectors,
with the exception of supervising inspectors and confidential
clerks. There was no union security agreement, but Consoli-
dated agreed to recommend union membership to all new em-
ployees, and further agreed not to discriminate against or intimi-
date any employee because of his union membership. The agree-
ment contained a collective-bargaining provision which eventually
led to binding arbitration. In a complaint filed with the Board,
the union claimed that Consolidated discriminated against the
union by discouraging union membership among its employees.
The Board found that Consolidated was guilty of an unfair labor
practice in that it was interfering with, coercing, and restraining
employees who might otherwise join the union. However, the
Board dismissed a second complaint that Consolidated refused to
bargain, in that it had agreed to submit the union's grievance to
binding arbitration. 3 In this instance, the Board deferred its
jurisdiction to allow the arbitrator's award to reflect the final de-
termination of this matter.
The Schlitz Brewing Co. decision is almost directly analo-
gous to that rendered in Collyer. Here the employer decided to
close down the production line during employee coffee breaks
rather than provide relief workers to maintain the line. This ac-
tion was taken without any negotiation. The union filed an un-
fair labor practice complaint charging the employer with a viola-
tion of Section 8(a) (5)"4 in that it had initiated a unilateral
change which it had refused to negotiate. The Board determined
that the resolution of this dispute should be left to the parties un-
der their grievance-arbitration procedure.75
73. 47 N.L.R.B. 694, 705-07 (1943).
74. N.L.R.A. § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5) (1970), supra, n.15.
75. 175 N.L.R.B. 141, 142, 70 L.R.R.M. 1472, 1475 (1969), wherein the
Board stated:
Thus, we believe that where, as here, the contract clearly provides for
grievance and arbitration machinery, where unilateral action taken is
not designed to undermine the Union and is not patently erroneous but
rather is based on a substantial claim of contractual privilege, and it
appears that the arbitral interpretation of the contract will resolve both
the unfair labor practice issue and the contract interpretation issue in
a manner compatible with the purposes of the Act, then the Board
should defer to the arbitration clause conceived by the parties. This
particular case is indeed an appropriate one for just such deferral. The
parties have an unusually long and successful bargaining relationship;
they have a dispute involving substantive contract interpretation almost
classical in its form, each party asserting a reasonable claim in good
faith in a situation wholly devoid of unlawful conduct or aggravated cir-
cumstances of any kind; they have a clearly defined grievance-arbitra-
tion procedure which Respondent has urged the Union to use for re-
solving their dispute; and significantly the Respondent, the party which
in fact desires to abide by the terms of its contract, is the same party
which, although it firmly believed in good faith in its right under the
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The Board's Decision In Collyer Insulated Wire
The majority opinion The majority opinion carefully ex-
amined the circumstances between the parties to this dispute. In
its analysis, the majority noted the long and productive bargain-
ing relationship between the parties, the provision for the mutual
resolution of conflicts in the collective-bargaining agreement, the
absence of any claim of enmity between the parties, and the will-
ingness of Collyer to arbitrate its unilateral action. Additionally,
the arbitration provision was broad enough in scope to encom-
pass a complete resolution of the points at issue.
On this basis, the majority determined that the dispute
would be well suited for settlement through arbitration. It
adopted this line in view of the fact that the entire dispute re-
volved about an interpretation of the parties' present contractual
agreement. The Board further determined that the National La-
bor Relations Act should only become involved in a dispute where
the arbitration agreement, examined in light of the history of ne-
gotiation and the practices of the parties, clearly does not sanction
the right of one of the parties to perform a unilateral act. This
threshold determination, however, is within the expertise of the
arbitrator, and can be made without the Board's involvement.
The majority does not believe that it has violated the stand-
ard announced in Spielberg76 by determining that the Board
should defer its jurisdiction to private arbitration in the absence
of an arbitral award.77 The Spielberg standard prescribes that
"[t]he proceedings appear to have been fair and regular, all par-
ties had agreed to be bound, and the decision of the arbitration
panel is not clearly repugnant to the purposes and policies of the
Act."' 7s  Here, the contract obligates the parties to be bound by
the arbitrator's award. At this juncture, the Board is unwilling to
adopt the presumption that such arbitration proceedings will fail
to meet the Spielberg standard.79 It is the majority's contention
that the Board should maintain jurisdiction only against the
chance possibility that the arbitral award would fail to meet this
standard, or that the matter was not promptly brought to arbitra-
contract to take the action it did take, offered to discuss the entire mat-
ter with the Union prior to taking such action. Accordingly, under the
principles above stated, and the persuasive facts in this case, we believe
that the policy of promoting industrial peace and stability through col-
lective bargaining obliges us to defer the parties to the grievance-arbi-
tration procedures they themselves have voluntarily established.
76. 112 N.L.R.B. 1080, 36 L.R.R.M. 1152 (1955).
77. 192 N.L.R.B. No. 150, -, 77 L.R.R.M. 1931, 1937 (1971).
78. 112 N.L.R.B. 1080, 1082, 36 L.R.R.M. 1152, 1153 (1955), as quoted
at 192 N.L.R.B. No. 150, -, 77 L.R.R.M. 1931, 1937 (1971).
79. 192 N.L.R.B. No. 150, -, 77 L.R.R.M.'1931, 1937 (1971).
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tion.80 In this manner, the parties are allowed to settle their
grievances under the provisions of the arbitration clause in their
collective-bargaining agreement without the Board totally relin-
quishing its jurisdiction as to allow the continued perpetration of
an unfair labor practice or an unsatisfactory arbitral award.81
With its decision, the majority does not intend to enforce
compulsory arbitration. Rather, the decision serves only to pres-
ent the Board's desire to give full effect to the parties' own vol-
untary agreement to submit all disputes to arbitration. 2  By
enforcing the arbitration clause of the collective-bargaining
agreement, no party will be able to sidestep this provision by pre-
senting its complaints to a higher authority.88  If the collective-
bargaining agreement is to be given any force or effect, as was
intended by Congress with the passage of the Labor Management
Relations Act,84 then the Board must secure its enforcement un-
der the provisions of the Act.8
Nor should the Board's decision be construed as stripping
the parties of their statutory rights under the Act.86 Courts have
long recognized that industrial relations disputes may involve
conduct which contravenes both the collective-bargaining agree-
ment and the provisions of the Act. However, by having the par-
ties follow their established grievance-arbitration procedure, ex-
perience has demonstrated that such means will resolve the under-
lying dispute and make it unnecessary for either party to follow
the more formal and sometimes lengthy procedures provided un-
der the Act.87
To support its conclusions, the majority proceeds to illus-
trate judicial support for arbitration by referencing the Supreme
Court's decisions in Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln
Mills of Alabama,8 and Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks
Union, Local 770.89 With these decisions the court points to the
congressional mandate for adherence to private and voluntary
means for the settlement of industrial relations disputes.
In Lincoln Mills90 the court determined that Section 30111
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See note 11, supra.
85. 192 N.L.R.B. No. 150, -, 77 L.R.R.M. 1931, 1937 (1971).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
89. 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
90. In Lincoln Mills, the respondent refused to agree to submit several dis-
putes to arbitration, although the collective agreement contained provisions for
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of the Act provided a means to enforce arbitration agreements, as
well as allowing for suit by one party against the other. This in-
terpretation of Section 301 was based upon the expressed con-
gressional intent that arbitration agreements be given their full
force and effect in preference to any action taken either by the
courts or the National Labor Relations Board. 2  However, the
decision does provide that the law to be applied in enforcing arbi-
tration agreements must be federal law drawn from the National
Labor Relations Act.93
In Boys Markets,9 the court determined whether a state
court can issue an injunction under Section 301 , 5 or whether
such an action would violate Section 7 of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act. 6  After reviewing the development of federal labor legisla-
tion, the court found that to implement congressional policy fa-
voring the voluntary establishment of a mechanism for the peace-
ful resolution of labor disputes, equitable relief must be available
in both federal and state courts. In this regard, Section 7 of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act cannot serve to deprive the parties to an
arbitration agreement of their right to seek equitable relief in any
court under the provisions of Section 301.97
With these two decisions, the Supreme Court has provided
that any party to an aribitration agreement has effective legal
means to insure faithful performance under that agreement. For
this reason, the Collyer majority concludes that it is consistent
with the fundamental objective of federal law to require the par-
ties to an arbitration agreement to honor their contractual obliga-
tions, rather than allowing them to ignore their respective agree-
such a procedure. The union then brought suit under Section 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act (29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970)) to compel the respondent
to arbitrate these differences.
91. L.M.R.A. § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970).
92. 353 U.S. 448, 451 (1957).
93. Id. at 456.
94. In Boys Markets the petitioner and the respondent were parties to a
collective-bargaining agreement which contained an arbitration clause. A dis-
pute arose when the union demanded that certain stock work be performed ex-
clusively by the union personnel. Petitioner then sought to invoke the griev-
ance-arbitration procedure to settle this dispute, and demanded that the union
cease its work-stoppage. The union refused. The petitioner then sought to en-
join the strike through the state courts. This action brought the matter before
the United States Supreme Court. The issue before the court was whether the
state court could issue an injunction under Section 301 (L.M.R.A. § 301, 29
U.S.C. § 185 (1970)), or whether such an action would be in violation of Section
7 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act (29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1970)).
95. L.M.R.A. § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970).
96. Norris-LaGuardia Act, ch. 90, 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15
(1970), Section 7 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act curtails the ability of the fed-
eral courts to issue injunctions against labor unions.
97. 398 U.S. 235, 253 (1970).
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ments by casting their disputes in statutory terms. It is for these
reasons that the Board dismissed the complaint against Collyer,
but retained jurisdiction for the limited purpose of determining
whether the subsequent arbitral award would be within the pre-
scription of the Spielberg98 standard. The Board hopes that this
decision will dispel any conclusion that the Board has approved
a policy favoring the "dual" litigation of similar disputes before
both an arbitrator and the Board. 9
The minority view The minority opinion follows much the
same course as the majority members'. They too are forced into
an examination of past court and Board decisions in a vain effort
to find language which directly supports their point of view. Un-
able to find direct support, the minority is compelled to base its
arguments upon inferential reasoning from case decisions.
From the two minority opinions, three viable arguments are
presented. It is first contended that the majority decision will
lead to the elimination of statutory rights guaranteed to the indi-
vidual employee.100 In support of this argument, the minority
points to the rule of the decision which compels all parties subject
to a collective-bargaining agreement containing a grievance-arbi-
tration provision to submit all labor disputes to arbitration, includ-
ing unfair labor practice complaints. Since the individual em-
ployee is recognized as a party to the collective-bargaining agree-
ment via his membership in the signatory union, this ruling would
force him to arbitrate his individual disputes against either the
union or the employer.
This argument was recognized by Chairman Miller after the
issuance of the Board's decision. He admits the error of failing
to include a guaranty of individual statutory rights, but states that
the majority had no intention of depriving the employee of these
rights.' In short, the individual employee will always maintain
his direct access to the Board.
The second argument advanced by the minority concerned
the Board's ability to defer its authority in the settlement of un-
fair labor practice complaints to private arbitration.10 2 This ar-
gument cannot be answered immediately, for the courts have yet
to rule upon this issue. However, any further decision by the
courts will require that they attempt to balance the two congres-
sional objectives in federal labor regulation: (1) the Taft-Hartley
98. 112 N.L.R.B. 1080, 36 L.R.R.M. 1152 (1955).
99. 192 N.L.R.B. No. 150, -, 77 L.R.R.M. 1931, 1938 (1971).
100. Id. at-, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1942, 1946-47.
101. See note 11, supra, at D-3.
102. 192 N.L.R.B. No. 150, -, 77 L.R.R.M. 1931, 1943 (1971).
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amendments to the N.L.R.A. favoring the voluntary self-regula-
tion of labor-management relations and (2) the strict standards
of federal regulation found in the original Act.
A third argument concerns the field of arbitration in general
and the ability of arbitrators to fairly and correctly judge unfair
labor practice complaints. 103  It is the contention of the minority
that arbitrators as a group lack the necessary legal and technical
expertise to effectively rule on these issues. In the minority's
view, only the Board, with its trained legal and technical staff,
has the ability to fairly and judiciously adjudicate these disputes.
CONSIDERATION OF THE ARBITRAL PROCESS
Over the years there has been a great deal of critical com-
ment regarding the arbitration process and the ability of the indi-
vidual arbitrator to successfully resolve labor disputes.1 4 The
majority of writers favor arbitration as the only available means
of achieving a completely voluntary system of industrial self-regu-
lation. However, the critics of the system point to its inequities,
claiming that at best it presents a mediocre procedure for the set-
tlement of contractual disputes, and that it is not at all suited for
the adjudication of unfair labor practice complaints.
The proponents of arbitration point to speed and dexterity
in rendering an award as its main advantage.' In essence, the
arbitral process envisions a trained expert coming to the situs of
the controversy, hearing the presentations of both sides to the dis-
pute, and then rendering an award based upon the presentations,
the provisions of the collective-bargaining agreement, and his own
expertise in the industry. This positive view is apparently widely
shared; 94% of all collective-bargaining agreements contain
grievance-arbitration machinery.'06
103. Id. at -, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1948-49.
104. See: Dunau, Three Problems in Labor Arbitration, 55 VA. L. REV. 427
(1969); Cohen, ILR3: Poacher on the Arbitral Domain, 55 A.B.A.J. 437
(1969); Abramson, NLRB: Is The Sheriff Not the Poacher, 55 A.B.A.J. 853
(1969); Comment, The NLRB and Deference to Arbitration, 77 YALE L.J. 1191
(1968); Comment, NLRB v. Strong: The Board Versus The Courts & Arbitra-
tion, 23 S.W.L.J. 756 (1969); Davey, Restructuring Grievance Arbitration Pro-
cedures: Some Modest Proposals, 54 IOWA L. REV. 560 (1969); Bond, The
Concurrence Conundrum: The Overlapping Jurisdiction of Arbitration & The
National Labor Relations Board, 42 S. CAL. L. REV. 4 (1968); Block, The
NLRB & Arbitration: Is The Board's Expanding Jurisdiction Justified?, 19 LABOR
L.J. No. 10 (1968).
105. Cohen, NLRB: The Poacher on the Arbitral Domain, 55 A.B.A.J. 437
(1969).
106. Bond, The Concurrence Conundrum: The Overlapping Jurisdiction of Ar-
bitration and the National Labor Relations Board, 42 S. CAL. L. REV. 4, 6
(1969).
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The critics of the system point to the fact that an arbitrator
is not required to have any legal training."" If he has not been
legally trained, they argue, he can have no appreciation of the use
of stare decisis in establishing a uniformity of decisions within a
particular industrial field. Also, without legal training the arbitrator
would be unable to recognize illegal contract provisions, or to prop-
erly interpret and apply federal and state statutes with regard to a
written agreement or an unfair labor practice complaint. The result
of these procedural errors which could occur as a direct result ot
the arbitrator's lack of legal training would be a denial of proce-
dural due process to the parties in dispute.""
In addition to examining the qualifications of the individual
arbitrator, the critics have also taken the entire arbitration proc-
ess to task. They first point to the fact that there are no uniform
rules among the three major arbitrators' associations. °9 Further,
the arbitrator does not possess the means of enforcing his deci-
sion." Additionally, the arbitrator is only able to bind the sig-
natories to the collective-bargaining agreement,"' and may even
find that the agreement which gives him jurisdiction also sets ex-
acting limitations upon his ability to adjudicate the issues before
him." 2 Once the award has been rendered, there is no clear
definition of the legal status to be assigned to it."l
CONCLUSION
It is true that there are problems with the arbitral process as
it is presently constituted. However, this does not mean that these
problems cannot be solved, or that arbitration cannot be a fair
and equitable means for insuring the private settlements of labor
disputes. With its decision in Collyer, the Board has given a new
status and recognition to arbitration. However, in order to pro-
tect arbitration from its critics, the Board should establish uni-
form standards and regulations for the arbitration profession. By
standardizing the arbitral process, the Board could guarantee pro-
cedural due process, while insuring that all awards are rendered in
light of the latest Board pronouncements regarding federal labor
107. Christensen, Book Review, 19 STAN. L. REV. 671 (1967); see also Com-
ment, The NLRB and Deference to Arbitration, 77 YALE L. J. 1191, 1194-95,
n.28 (1968).
108. 19 STAN. L. REV. 671, 676 (1967).
109. Davey, Restructuring Grievance Arbitration Procedures, 54 IowA L.
REV. 560 (1969).
110. Dunau, Three Problems in Labor Arbitration, 55 VA. L. REV. 427, 439
(1969).
111. 77 YALE L. J. 1191, 1195 (1968).
112. 55 VA. L. REV. 427, 447 (1969).
113. 19 STAN. L. REV. 671, 676 (1967).
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policy. Such an enactment would also allow the Board a chance
to review the awards rendered on unfair labor practice complaints
to insure their compliance with the Spielberg 14 standard.
To date the Collyer decision has remained intact. It is more
than likely that this decision will continue to prevail because, in
reality, it does not represent so radical an innovation. Re-
viewing the entire development of federal labor policy, the Col-
lyer decision represents only the next natural step toward the pre-
existing goal of total industrial self-regulation. The significance
of the Collyer decision is that it clearly states the National Labor
Relations Board's adoption of this goal.
Bruce E. Allen
114. 112 N.L.R.B. 1080, 1082, 18 L.R.R.M. 1152, 1153 (1955).
